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U.S.-North Korea Relations: 
The Nuclear Issue 
Edward A. Olsen 
Long term US-North Korea tensions were intensified 
since the mid-1990s by North Korea’s pursuit of a 
nuclear weapons option and the United States’ greater 
focus on its post-Cold War nonproliferation agenda. 
North Korea’s use of brinkmanship diplomatic tactics 
caused the United States’ post-9/11 global strategy to pay 
more attention to the DPRK as part of the “axis of evil.” 
Both U S .  and North Korean policies displayed hawkish 
proclivities that heightened the risks - compounded by the 
geopolitical controversy surrounding the United States’ 
Iraq War. The situation was made more complex by the 
difering U S .  and ROK perspectives on how to cope with 
North Korea’s challenge. Leaders in Seoul were more 
inclined toward flexible engagement while US leaders 
were averse to concessions and hopeful about regime 
change. 
Reconciling these diferences proved to be difJicult, but 
the six-party talks helped that process. U S .  policy 
toward this entire situation aimed at resolving the North 
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Korean nuclear issue could be greatly improved if 
American analysts and policy makers on North Korean 
aflairs would pay more attention to the nuances behind 
DPRK policy, be more creative in utilizing China’s 
influence, and improve the United States’ policy 
planning bureaucracy. 
Key words: nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, 
unifictztion, six-party talks, balancer, brinkmanship, 
regime change, non-aggression, multilateralism, axis 
of evil 
The United States and North Korea have had a troubled 
relationship since the creation of the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (DPRK) September 9, 1948, in the wake of 
the US.-backed creation of the Republic of Korea (ROK) on 
August 15 1948 and three preceding years of increasing tensions 
within the Korean nation divided into two post-World War 11 
occupation zones. Since the 1948 turning point U.S.-DPRK 
relations were worsened in the course of the bitter Korean War, 
the divided peninsula’s front line role throughout the Cold War, 
and North Korea’s pursuit of an assertive geopolitical agenda 
that made the: DPRK an anachronistic remnant of the Cold War 
in the post-Cold War era.’ For the United States the DPRK was 
one of many strategic adversaries, but a particularly nasty one 
because of its hostile attitude, dictatorial rigidity, and opaque 
qualities that made it difficult to understand and deal with. For 
I .  The author assessed the nature and consequences of the Korean nation’s division in 
depth in, Korea, The Divided Nation (Westport: Greenwood Praeger Publishers, 2005). 
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North Korea in principle the United States epitomized an 
imperial threat to everything the DPRK represented and in 
practice posed a tangible military threat to the DPRK’s very 
existence. 
In this sense the adversarial nature of U.S.-DPRK relations was 
distinctly imbalanced. While North Korea was part of an 
international milieu of threats posed to U.S. national interests 
that had to be taken very seriously by Washington, it was not a 
threat to the United States’ literal existence. On the other hand, 
the United States’ adversarial threats to North Korea were far 
more profound, causing genuine fear and hatred of Americans, 
and focusing North Korean animosity toward the United States 
in a very harsh manner. Against this background North 
Korea’s expanded experimentation with its nuclear weapons 
option in the post-Cold War years, knowing full well that the 
United States had blocked the ROK from pursuing that option 
during the Park Chung-hee admini~tration,~ caused a pronounced 
intensification of u.s.-DPRK  friction^.^ 
2 
2. The author exanuned the roots of North Korea’s foreign policy in the inaugural 
issue of the first American scholarly journal focusing on North Korea in, “U.S.-North 
Korea: Foreign Policy Dilemmas,” North Korea Review (Fall 2005). 
3.  For background on the United States’ role in blocking South Korea’s nuclear option, 
see, Selig Hamson, Chapter 20, “South Korea and Nuclear Weapons,” Korean 
Endgame; A Strategy for  Reunification and US. Disengagement (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press 2002). 
4. These frictions have been assessed in a diverse spectrum of analyses, see, Michael J. 
Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation (New York: St. 
Martins 1995); Young-whan Kihl and Peter Hayes, eds., Peace and Securiry in 
Northeast Asia: The Nuclear Issue and the Korean Peninsula (Armonk, NY: M.E. 
Sharpe 1997); Leon V. Segal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North 
Korea (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1998); James Clay Moltz and Alexandre 
Mansourov, eds., The North Korean Nuclear Prograin (New York: Routledge 2000); 
Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, Nuclear North Korea: A Debate of Engagement 
Strategies (New York: Columbia University Press 2003); and Jasper Becker. Rogue 
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From a U.S. perspective tensions surrounding North Korea 
escalate unpredictably on an almost daily basis. Much of this 
volatile situation can be ascribed to Pyongyang’s willingness to 
engage in a reckless combination of provocative acts and 
rhetorical tirades that constitute its infamous diplomatic 
brinkmanship. North Korea’s willingness to make pointed use of 
its nuclear option in a high level U.S.-DPRK diplomatic meeting 
in October 2002 seems to have been motivated by a desire to 
reinforce its peculiar brand of deterrence.s The Kim Jong-il 
government was further emboldened in subsequent months by 
the combination of two sets of circumstances. First, there were 
favorable political developments in South Korea - in the form 
of the December 2002 election of President Roh Moo-hyun 
who strongly favors ROK engagement of the DPRK and took 
office riding a wave of strident anti-Americanism.6 The second 
were the United States’ commitments within its war on terrorism 
and related tensions in the Middle East that stretched U.S.‘ 
strategic resources. Against this political and geopolitical 
background North Korea saw an opportunity. 
Pyongyang proceeded to do its utmost to make the 
international community, with the United States in the forefront 
as the sole superpower, pay more attention to North Korea’s dire 
Regime: Kim Jong I1 and the Looming Threat of North Korea (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005). 
5. For coverage of that meeting, see, Doug Struck, “U.S. Plays Down Talks with N. 
Korean Officials,” Washington Post, October 6,  2002; and Howard W. French, “U.S. 
Envoy Angers North Korea,” New York Times, October 8,2002. 
6. For coverage of that wave, see, Choong-nam Kim, ‘‘Bush’s America is Getting a 
Bad Name,” International Herald Tribune, September 26, 2002; Robert Marquand, 
“Anti-US voices surge in streets of a major Asian ally,” Christian Science Monitor 
(December 16,2002); and Peter S. Goodman and Joo Hee Cho, “Anti-U.S. Sentiment 
Deepens in S. Korea,” Washington Post, January 9, 2003. 
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economic straits by taking its geopolitical posture more 
seriously. The DPRK has been in bad shape for years, causing 
many foreign observers to anticipate its collapse7 - even as 
more hopeful South Koreans viewed these conditions as an 
opportunity to reach out to their fellow Koreans in an attempt to 
induce inter-Korean reconciliation through the provision of 
economic assistance that would, in turn, lead to the 
transformation of Pyongyang’s policies. This was the basis of 
President Kim Dae-jung’ s innovative Sunshine Policy approach 
to inter-Korean issues. Despite some sporadic inter-Korean 
accomplishments, not much of genuine substance was being 
done to reduce U.S.-DPRK tensions on the nuclear front 
drawing on the legacy of the Clinton administration’s 
negotiations with North Korea. Given the Kim Jong-il regime’s 
odd world view based on its juche ideology,’ Pyongyang 
decided to maximize its leverage amidst the multiple pressures 
7. Far journalistic assessments of North Korean socio-economic problems and North 
Korean efforts to rectify them, see, Jim Mann, “U.S. Watches North Korea for Signs 
of Collapse,” Los Angeles Times, February 12, 1996; and John Pomfret, “Reforms 
Turn Disastrous for North Korea,” Washington Post, January 27, 2003. For scholarly 
assessments of that issue, see, Nicholas Eberstadt, The End of North Korea 
(Washington, DC: The AEI Press, 1999); Marcus Noland, Avoiding the Apocalypse: 
The Future of the Two Koreas (Washington, DC: Institute for International 
Economics, 2000); and Marcus Noland. Korea Afrer Kim Jong II (Washington, DC: 
Institute for International Economics, 2004). 
8 .  For contextual background on this policy, see, Moon Chung-in and David 
1.Steinberg. eds., Kim Dae-jung Government and Sunshine Policy: Promises nnd 
Chalienges (Washington, DC and Seoul: Georgetown University Press and Yonsei 
University Press, 1999); and Norman D. Levin and Yong-sup Han, Sunshine in 
Korea; The South Korean Debate Over Policies Toward North Korea (Santa Monica: 
RAND, 2002). 
9. For a solid appraisal of that ideology, see, Han S. Park, “The Nature and Evolution 
of Juche Ideology,” in Han S. Park, ed., North Korea: Ideology, Politics, Econorn.v 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1996). 
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upon its American foes by upping the ante in the form of several 
cage rattling endeavors. 
From late 2002 through early 2003 North Korea consciously 
pushed the envelope. With one eye on the United States’ 
decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty, Pyongyang 
announced its plans to withdraw from the Nuclear Non- 
proliferation Treaty, inflaming tensions surrounding its 
violations ol’ the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework.” Then, with 
an eye on the Bush administration’s development of a 
controversial post-9/11 preemptive strategic doctrine that 
diminishes the United States’ reliance on the principles of 
deterrence, Pyongyang as noted below claimed the same 
prerogative. Also, knowing full well that the armistice that had 
halted the Korean War had an ambiguous legacy in South Korea 
and that South Koreans were still hopeful that an ROK-DPRK 
“Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchanges & 
Cooperation” [emphasis added] that went into effect in 1992 is 
fully viable, Pyongyang pushed the non-aggression pact 
theme vis-a-vis the United States. North Korean elites had to 
know this idea would resonate positively among South Korea’s 
progressive leaders. Given the long-standing American aversion 
to unenforceable international agreements to outlaw war that 
American skeptics consider to be utopian, Pyongyang 
presumably knew this option was a non-starter for the United 
States, but pushed it in order to embarrass Washington 
11 
10. For coverage of North Korea’s actions, see. Seth Mydans, “North Korea Says It Is 
Withdrawing From Arms Treaty,” New York Tirnes, January 10, 2003; and “North 
Korea Announces to Withdraw From NPT,” Koran Un@cicntion Bulletin (February 
2003). 
1 1 .  For background on that “agreement,” see, Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, A 
Contemporary History (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1997). 
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conservative decision makers and complicate U.S. relations with 
Seoul’s more idealistic liberal leaders. 
All of these maneuvers were compounded by a series of 
North Korean military provocations - including violations of 
the DMZ air space, missile tests into the East Sea, and pursuit of 
a U.S. reconnaissance plane in international air space.I2 Most 
observers of North Korea anticipate these type of military 
provocations will continue and may well be escalated. While it 
is clear that North Korea’s approach to international affairs is 
motivated by its economic vulnerabilities l3 that are 
undermining its strategic assets, those weaknesses do not 
prevent it from being a major threat to stability in Asia via such 
brinkmanship. As such it poses an enormous challenge to U.S. 
policy in the region. 
Arguably the greatest evolving danger is North Korea’s 
perception that contemporary U.S. strategic policy is 
substantially in the hands of neo-conservatives who intend to 
deal with North Korea after achieving ‘regime change’ in Iraq -- 
either by toppling the DPRK via sanctions or via preemptive 
military strikes aimed at eliminating its nuclear capabilities. 
The accuracy of this perception is debatable, but North Korean 
analysts who follow the American policy debate in the major 
12. The United States’ responses to a series of North Korean actions was tempered. 
see, Howard LaFranchi, “Why US Is Reacting Quietly to N. Korea’s Provocations.” 
Christian Science Monitor, March 5 ,  2003. That included responses to the act most 
pointedly targeted at the United States: Bradley Graham and Glenn Kessler, “N. 
Korea ‘rails U.S. Spy Plane,” Washington Post, March 4, 2003; and Eric Schmitt. 
“North Korea’s MIGs Intercept U.S. Jet on Spying Mission.” New York Times, March 
4, 2003. 
13. The author assessed North Korea’s evolving socio-economic status in the 
Bertelstnann Transformation Index 2005 at <www.bertelsmann-transformation- 
index .de>. 
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media will have found prominent examples of U.S. neo- 
conservatives advocating a more assertive U.S. policy toward 
North Korea.I4 North Korean analysts of U.S. policy-making, 
who inform the views of their leaders in Pyongyang, cannot 
have missed the U.S. media’s extensive coverage of American 
neo-conservatives’ impact upon U.S. strategy toward Iraq. ’’ 
North Korean anxieties in that regard were unlikely to have been 
calmed by repeated reassurances from the White House that the 
United States “has no intention of invading North Korea.” The 
more a ground force conventionally armed “invasion” is 
disavowed, the more the North Koreans seem to be convinced 
the United States has other military plans for a preemptive 
attack. Although the details of this North Korean perspective 
has not received much attention in the United States, they have 
appeared in the press. The DPRK Foreign Ministry’s Deputy 
Director, Ri Pyong-gap said - using the phrase noted above - 
“The United States says that after Iraq, we are next, but we have 
our own countermeasures. Preemptive attacks are not the 
14. For a cross-section of such perspectives during a formative phase of U.S.-ROK 
policy making, see, Ju Yong-jung, “US Hawk [Richard Perle] Warns Not To Rule Out 
Military Option,” Chosun Ilbo, December 18, 2002; Max Boot, “Korean Crisis 
Reveals U.S. War Flaws,” USA Today, January 8, 2003; Charles Krauthammer, 
“Korea Follies,” Washington Post, January 17, 2003; and William Kristol and Robert 
Kagan, “North Korea Goes South,” The Weekly Standard, January 20, 2003. For a 
more authentic conservative’s view of that option, see, Henry S. Rowen, “Kim Jong il 
Must Go,” Policy Review (Hoover Institution, October/November 2003). 
15. For scholarly analyses of that issue, see, Gary Dorrien, Imperial Designs; 
Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana (New York: Routledge, 2004); James 
Mann, The Rise of The Vulcans; The History of Bush’s War Cabinet (New York: 
Viking Penguin, 2004); and Jon Western, Selling Intervention and War; The 
Presidency, the Media, and the American Public (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2005). 
U.S.-North Korea Relations / 61 
exclusive right of the United States.”16 And the KCNA, North 
Korea’s news agency, noted “the US intention to make a 
preemptive strike at [North Korea’s] nuclear facilities.”” North 
Korea’s perceptions of U.S. motives clearly are open to serious 
question, but that does not diminish their salience for the 
Northeast Asian threat environment. 
North Korea’s perceptions of American motivations and U.S. 
strategic intentions toward the DPRK also should be taken more 
seriously because of the apparent impact they have had among 
South Koreans as a result of Pyongyang’s appeals to pan-Korean 
solidarity. Although South Korean officials are well aware that 
North Korea long has sought to drive wedges between 
Washington and Seoul that will disrupt the U.S.-ROK alliance’s 
cohesiveness, and routinely discount such efforts, Pyongyang’s 
appeals seem to be reaching a more amenable South Korean 
audience. Partly because of sporadic South Korean anti- 
American sentiments that feed ambiguity about U.S. interests 
regarding Korea, and partly because of South Korean unease 
about the Bush administration’s usage of the “axis of evil” 
metaphor with attendant fears that the United States will 
successively pursue “regime change’’ in each member of the 
axis,I8 North Korea’s message is effective among a sizable 
proportion of South Koreans. Because of South Korean fears 
about the impact U.S. military action against North Korea 
almost certainly would have on South Korea, South Koreans 
16. Quoted in Jonathan Watts, “N Korea Threatens US With First Strike,” The 
Guardian, February 6,  2003. 
17. Quoted in Simon Jeffery, ‘‘ North Korea: US Intends to Attack Us,” The Guurdian, 
March 7,2003. 
18. The author examined that aspect of U.S.-Korea relations in detail in “ ‘Axis of 
Evil’: Impact on U.S.-Korean Relations,” Korea and World Affairs (Summer 2002). 
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have become more critical of what is perceived as a U.S. 
tendency toward unilateralism. Against this background South 
Korea’s new president, Roh Moo-hyun, shortly before taking 
office observed “Koreans should stand together, although things 
will get difficult when the United States bosses us around.”” 
And, after he took office President Roh, as part of a campaign to 
encourage the United States to pursue a bilateral dialogue 
process with North Korea, urged the United States “not to go too 
far” in its pressures to resolve the nuclear problem.20 His first 
Unification Minister, Jeong Se-hyun, elaborated on that 
approach when he asked “How could the United States ignore 
South Korea’s position and contradict it while pursuing its North 
Korean policy?” 21 The consequences of President Roh’s 
approach to U.S.-ROK alliance relations in a regional context 
shall be assessed below. 
Because of such North Korean anxieties, and their ability to 
disrupt U.S.-ROK harmony, there is great risk that North Korea 
will try to take advantage of the United States being stretched 
thin as a result of the pressures created by the war in Iraq, 
through escalating its brinkmanship. Taking a provocative 
military step that could lead to a second front war may well be 
seen by Pyongyang as a way to compel the United States to 
negotiate bilaterally on North Korea’s terms. Such 
circumstances could easily get out of control - escalating to a 
19. Quoted in Howard W. French, “North Korea Crisis Straining Washington’s Asian 
Alliances,” Infernational Herald Tribune, February 25,2003. 
20. Quoted in Hong Soon-il, “Pawn of Saber Rattling,” Korea Times, March 12.2003. 
21. Quoted in Seo Hyun-jin, “ U.S.-N.K. Tension Unlikely to Lead to War, experts 
say,” Korea Hmzld, March 6 ,  2003. Jeong’s critical statement also was quoted as 
“How can the U.S. ignore South Korea and go against our will in pursuing its North 
Korean policy?” in Reuters, “Roh’s Words Reveal Gulf With Washington,” Taipei 
Times, March 6 ,  2003. 
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full scale war that could be far more daunting than the situation 
in Iraq. Pyongyang will not necessarily wait until the United 
States wraps things up in Iraq and can turn its full attention - 
diplomatically or militarily - to North Korea. Although the 
United States seems poised to cope with more North Korean 
reckless brinkmanship in the heat of war with Iraq, Pyongyang 
may well take advantage of the United States being stretched 
thin to use its own preemptive preemption strategy. In this sense, 
for many Americans, North Korea represents a profoundly 
serious threat to world peace that has stirred a serious debate 
within the United States.22 
One way out of this potential disaster would be for the United 
States to recognize and accept the ways Pyongyang’s bid for a 
bilateral dialogue process with Washington meshes with Seoul’s 
objectives. South Korea’s long-standing aspirations for regional 
multilateralism aimed at Korean reconciliation and reunification 
is predicated on providing North Korea with the same level of 
bilateral connections that South Korea has had for years as a 
result of the success of the ROK’s late Cold War nordpolitik 
“cross recognition” plan. This enabled Seoul to use its newly 
established bilateral ties with China and Russia to reinforce its 
existing ties with the United States and Japan in order to 
strengthen multilateralism designed to induce moderation in 
22 For a sense of that debate, see, Selig S. Harrison, “Did North Korea Cheat?”, 
Foreign Affairs (JanuaryFebruary 2005): and Mitchell B. Reiss and Robert L. 
Gallucci, “Red-Handed; The Truth About North Korea’s Weapons Programs / Dead 
to Right,” Richard L. Garwin, “HEU Done It,” and Selig Harrison, “Harrison 
Replies,” Foreign Affuirs (MarcWApril 2005). For a survey of the debate’s context, 
see, Colonel David J. Bishop, “Dismantling North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons 
Program,” Curlisle Papers in Security Strategy, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 
Institute, U.S. Army War College (April 2005). 
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North Korea.23 
The origins of this conceptual framework are especially 
significant for the current U.S. administration. This South 
Korean paradigm’s roots are partially in the approach the 
previous (G.H. W.) Bush administration took toward post-Cold 
War limited multilateralism based on a foundation of 
bilateralism. That approach is what caused so much 
consternation for the Kim Dae-jung government when Henry 
Kissinger. in a March 2001 Washington Post column, advised 
the current Bush administration “Pyongyang must be convinced 
that the road to Washington leads through Seoul and not the 
other way around.”24 This approach is contrary to how former 
President Kim and current President Roh Moo-hyun visualize 
achieving a positive U.S.-North Korea dialogue process 
intended to reduce tensions and encourage the DPRK to join in a 
multilateral engagement process designed to facilitate inter- 
Korean peaceful reconciliation. In short, a genuine solution 
may be ‘-the other way around,” with improved U.S.-DPRK 
relations on the nuclear front acting as a catalyst for ROK- 
DPRK progress on the unification front. 
U.S.-North Korea bilateral negotiations focusing on resolving 
the nuclear problem can be integral to broader multilateral talks 
fostering tension reduction and inter-Korean reconciliation. 
North Korea continues to press for a non-aggression pact from 
the United States, despite its ‘poison pill’ qualities among the 
intended American policy-making audience.25 Nonetheless, if 
23. The viability of the United States using South Korea’s approach to North Korea 
was assessed by the author in “A Korean Solution to the United States’ Korean 
Problems,’‘ 7he Journal of East Asian Affairs (FallWinter 2003). 
24. Henry Kissinger, “A Road Through Seoul,” Washington Post, March 6,2000. 
25. The aulhor explored the nuances of the “poison pill” metaphor and US. 
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one juxtaposes North Korea’s desires for ousting a U.S. armed 
presence from Korea and American desires for eliminating 
North Korea’s threat potentials - especially its weapons of mass 
destruction - these desires could be ground for a consensus 
providing a de facto security guarantee. In exchange for 
verifiable North Korean demobilization of a significant 
proportion of its conventional forces and elimination of its 
WMD, the United States can offer reciprocal removal of all 
U.S. forces from Korea, enabling both sides to get what they 
want from each other.26 As the United States experiments with 
its transformation of the U.S. armed forces in ways that will lead 
to cuts in U.S. force levels in South Korea, the Bush 
administration should consider using such cuts as part of the 
U.S.-DPRK tension reduction process aimed at resolving the 
nuclear issue by reducing the potentials on each side for 
aggression against the other side. Equally important, such a 
bilateral exchange will incite mutual confidence building, 
facilitating North Korea’s regime transformation within a 
multilateral effort to bring North and South Korea closer 
together en route to national unification. 
Instead of running the risks so apparent in the current 
environment, it would be much more prudent for the United 
States to innovatively utilize South Korea’s approach to coping 
with North Korea. Rather than impeding our South Korean 
expectations about Korean failure in Toward Normalizing U.S.  -Korea Rehrions, In 
Due Course? (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002); and its expanded Korean translation: 
Hanmi kwangae ui sue jipyung (New Horizons of U.S.-Korea Relations) (Seoul: 
Ingansarang Publishers, 2003). 
26. As explained in a previous article that explored this option, “A Korean Solution to 
the Uniled States’ Korean Problems” (op. cit.), this “bargaining chip” approach was 
first raised by Kwak Tae-hwan in “US Military-Security Policy Toward the Korean 
Peninsula in the 1990s,” Korean Journal of Defense Analvsis (Winter 1995). 
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ally’s diplomatic agenda in ways that aggravate anti- 
Americanism among South Koreans and have contributed to a 
rift in U.S.-ROK relations, 27 it would be far better if 
Washington adopted Seoul’s approach to defusing the current 
round of nuclear crises and treated U.S.-North Korean bilateral 
negotiations as part of the foundation for multilateralism 
intended to mitigate North Korea’s threat potentials and be a 
catalyst for it to live in harmony with its neighbors. 
To achieve these goals it would be useful for Americans who 
shape U S .  policy toward North Korea’s nuclear agenda to grasp 
the nuances behind Pyongyang’s approach to brinkmanship. 
North Korean policy toward its nuclear option since the early 
1990s has been notorious for its brinkmanship approach -- using 
provocative acts and inflammatory rhetoric to escalate tensions 
in ways that either enhance Pyongyang’s power or its diplomatic 
leverage. The August 2003 six party talks in Beijing where 
North Korea’s representatives overtly announced its intention to 
conduct a nuclear test illustrated Pyongyang’s brinkmanship 
style. The new round of talks that were revived in February 
2004 raised questions about the prospects for North Korean 
brinkmanship. North Korea’s rapid withdrawal from that round 
of talks and prolonged manipulation of the conditions 
surrounding the DPRK’ s re-entry into the talks exacerbated 
concerns about Pyongyang’s use of brinkmanship.2* This is 
~ ~ 
27. For background on South Korea’s discontent regarding U.S. policy toward both 
Koreas, see, Eric V. Larson, et al, Ambivalent Allies? A Study of South Korean 
Attitudes Toward the U S .  (Santa Monica: RAND, 2004); and David Steinberg, ed., 
Korean Attitudes Toward the United States: Changing Dynamics (Armonk: M.E. 
Sharpe, 2005). 
28. For background on North Korea’s motives to manipulate the criteria for returning 
to the six-party talks, see, unattributed, “DPRK FM [Foreign Minister], On Its Stand 
to Suspend Its Participation in Six-party Talks for Indefinite Period” (February 10, 
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consistent with North Korea’s use of brinkmanship and may 
well be repeated intermittently as Pyongyang’s way of using 
pressure to counteract U.S. pressures. While many fear North 
Korea’s use of brinkmanship techniques is part of an aggressive 
stance that will lead to war, that perception is doubtful. North 
Korea’s frequent redefinition of a nuclear brink’s demarcation 
has another viable purpose. Pyongyang’s goal is not to go over 
the brink, but to be pulled back from the brink. 
Many wonder why North Korea, given its dismal societal 
condition and famines that seem to augur regime collapse, 
behaves in a reckless manner that encourages U.S. hard liners to 
contemplate regime change in this member of the “axis of evil.” 
Often the conclusion reached is that this behavior is calculated 
to irtduce the United States to acquiesce to North Korean 
blackmail: Rescue us on our terms, or else! In other words, if 
you Americans do not come to your senses and do whatever is 
necessary to help us North Koreans recover from our failed 
economic policies and facilitate our participation in the 
international economic system in ways that will enable the 
DPRK to close the gap with the ROK and deal with both South 
Korea and China on a level of greater parity, we North Koreans 
will fulfill your nightmare scenarios about our geopolitical 
insanity. In short, we North Koreans are prepared to go over 
the brink in ways you Americans should do your utmost to avoid. 
Although that contention is plausible, and it must be factored 
into U.S. calculations to the extent it draws upon South Korea’s 
2005) at <http:Nwww.kcna.co.jp>: Gordon Fairclough, “Seoul Tries to Lure North 
Korea Hack To Nuclear Talks,” Wall Street Journal, May 17, 2005; Donald Kirk, ”N. 
Korea Plays Waiting Game on Nuclear Talks,” Christian Science Moniror, May 20, 
2005; and David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, “North Korea Is Reported To Hint At 
Nuclear Talks,” New York Times, June 6, 2005. 
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unification policy agenda, it is more likely that North Korea is 
motivated by a more sophisticated model of an external rescue 
that may pose additional problems for U.S. policy toward all 
of Korea. 
Pyongyang’s brinkmanship does not seem to be simply a 
distracting tactic in a larger war-fighting strategy. Instead it is an 
essential element of a strategy designed to create two results. 
The first result is a form of interim deterrence versus what the 
North Koreans perceive as U.S. brinkmanship - the world’s sole 
superpower applying a preemptive doctrine toward a cluster of 
rogue states and terrorists. This aspect of its brinkmanship is 
designed to compensate for North Korea’s manifest weaknesses 
and to keep U.S. military capabilities which have been stretched 
thin by over  commitment^^^ as off balance as possible. A 
plausible case can be made that North Korea has succeeded in 
that regard. The second result is more important for 
Pyongyang’s view of North Korean survival, namely bringing 
about eventual third party intervention. Pyongyang’s goal seems 
to be to set the stage for external diplomatic and economic 
intervention that will pull the confrontational U.S.-North Korea 
parties away from the brink and act as a catalyst for resolving 
the North-South Korean national division en route to negotiated 
reunification. Increasingly the most likely candidate to fill that 
international role is China because of its ties to both Koreas, its 
29. North Korean analysts who follow the evolution of U.S. security policy and the 
criticism it has generated within the United States are presumably familiar with 
analyses such as: Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic 
Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987); 
Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: Tlze Costs and Consequences of American Empire 
(New York: Owl BooksiHenry Holt, 2000); and Clyde Prestowitz, Rogue Nation; 
Americarr Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions (New York: Basic Books, 
2003). 
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ability to play such a role in Asian regional affairs, and - under 
certain circumstances - its means to persuade Americans that 
this would be in the United States’ best interests. While a 
strong case can and should be made regarding U.S. policy 
options that the United States should try to play the major role 
as the facilitator of Korean reconciliation and unification as the 
means to resolve the nuclear dilemma as part of the peaceful 
negotiations process, 30 because the United States today is 
unwilling and unprepared to play that role it should be more 
innovative in how it might utilize another country in that role - 
namely China. 
North Korea’s use of brinkmanship is a perverse way of 
facilitating an amicable negotiated resolution of North Korea’s 
myriad problems as part of an inter-Korean confidence building 
process that will lead to co-existence and incremental 
reunification. North Koreans are well aware that the younger 
generation of their fellow Koreans in South Korea are avid 
supporters of such peaceful reconciliation processes. What both 
Koreas require is a mutual benefactor that is not perceived as 
currently tilting toward either Korea geopolitically. Despite 
China’s Cold War ties to North Korea, today the PRC fits that 
balanced bill more than any other country - including the 
United States. 
This was well illustrated by the visit of one of the PRC’s top 
leaders, Wu Bang-guo, to Pyongyang in October 2003 where he 
conducted negotiations with Kim Jong-il to support reviving the 
six-party talks. 3’  The later announcement of rescheduled 
30. The author explores that option more extensively in several analyses cited 
elsewhere in this chapter. 
31. Anthony Faiola, “N. Korea Agrees To Resume Nuclear Talks,” Washington Posf. 
October 3 1. 2003. 
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multilateral talks in Beijing was welcomed by Seoul. Not 
many South Koreans think a comparably high level U.S. official 
would be tasked with such a mission. That perception is 
reinforced by South Korean understanding of the sometimes 
ambiguous relations between North Korea and the PRC, due to 
ROK-PKC ties, that can be advantageous to Beijing but also 
used by Pyongyang on occasion.32 The PRC’s inter-Korean 
leverage also is demonstrated by China’s rise to the status of the 
ROK’s largest economic partner, South Korea’s ranking as the 
PRC’s second ranking foreign economic partner, and by China’s 
encouragement of the DPRK to emulate the brand of capitalist 
reforms that Chinese communists have so successfully embraced. 
China’s emergence as a major player in the overall economy of 
the Asia region strengthens its role vis-a-vis both Koreas and 
puts China back into its traditional hierarchical role regarding 
Korea. This stature reflects the entire world’s interest in the 
rapid rise of China.33 As positive as this can be, it also raises 
Korean concerns in both Koreas that a resurgent Chinese “big 
brother” may try to throw its weight around at Korea’s expense. 
32. For background on the PRC-DPRK peculiar relationship, see, Andrew Scobell, 
China and North Korea: From Comrades-In-Arms To Allies At Ann’s Lengih 
(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2004). 
33. For analyses of China’s growing role regarding Korea, see, Quangsheng Zhao, 
“China and the Korean Peace Process” in Tae-hwan Kwak and Seung-ho Joo, eds.. 
The Korean Peace Process and the Four Powers (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 
2003); Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, “The Korea Crisis,” Foreign Policy 
(May-June 2003); and Lee Guen, “The Rise of China and Korea’s China Policy” in 
Kokubun Ryosei and Wang Jisi, eds., The Rise of China and a Changing East Asia 
Order (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2004). For broader 
perspectices on China’s growing stature, see, Ross Temll, The New Chinese Empire: 
And What I t  Means for the United States (New York: Basic Books, 2003); and Clyde 
Prestowitz, Three Billion New Capiialists: The Great Shcji of Wealth and Power to the 
East (New York: Basic Books, 2005). 
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Such Korean concerns became very evident when China used its 
position on the legacy of the ancient Goguryeo kingdom’s 
Chinese versus Korean roots as a way to send a signal to both 
Koreas about who ranks where in Sino-Korean relations. 34 
Nonetheless, China is in an excellent position to mentor North 
Korean reforms, be a catalyst for inter-Korean reconciliation, 
and do many things to or for Korea that the United States is 
either unwilling or unable to do. 
China’s position vis-a-vis both Koreas is strengthened further 
by its relations with Japan and the United States, and their 
alliance. From Korean vantage points (North and South) Sino- 
Japanese relations loom largest because of Japan’s proximity, 
their history, and Japan’s perceived influence over U.S. policy 
toward Asia. With that relationship in the background, Koreans 
have tried to make the best of Japan’s policies toward each 
Korea.35 On balance, South Korean relations with Japan have 
been, and are, better than North Korea’s which have been made 
worse since the end of the Cold War by Japan’s fears of the 
DPRK’s nuclear and missile potentials and Tokyo’s readiness to 
cooperate with Washington in constraining North Korea.36 As 
34. For examples of Korean reactions to China’s stance on Goguryeo, see, Seo Hyun- 
jin, “Seoul Claims Firm Stance on Goguryeo,” Korea Herald, January 29, 2004: Kim 
Tong-hyung, “Culture Minister Warns Against Goguryeo Frenzy,” KOREA Now, 
January 24, 2004; and Choe Kwang-sik, “What Lies Behind China’s ‘Northeast 
Project’ ?,” KOREA Now, February 7, 2004. 
35. For background on each relationship, see, Seongho Sheen, “Japan-South Korea 
Relations: Slowly Lifting the Burden of History?, Honolulu: Occasional Paper Series, 
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (October 2003); and David Fouse, “Japan’s 
Post-Cold War North Korea Policy: Hedging Toward Autonomy?,” Honolulu: 
Occasional Paper Series, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (February 2004). 
36 For assessments of Japan’s increasingly hardline posture toward North Korea, see, 
unattributed, “Japan and North Korea; Not Yet Friends,” Economist (September 21, 
2002); Kaneko Takahara, “Diet Clears Bill To Hit North Korea With Sanctions,” 
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Japan’s role in U.S.-Japan policies toward North Korea 
underscored China’s constructive intermediary role between the 
two Koreas, it also called attention to the parallels between 
Sino-Japanese historical and territorial frictions37 and similar 
frictions between Japan and South Korea.38 Because Japan- 
ROK frictions over textbook issues and the Dokdo/Takeshima 
islands raised uncomfortable questions for Seoul about the 
interaction of the U.S.-ROK and U.S.-Japan alliances’ roles in 
preserving East Asian stability in the face of North Korean 
brinkmanship, South Korea indirectly benefited from the global 
attention to Sino-Japanese tensions that deflected attention from 
Japan-Korea frictions. 39 This enabled Seoul to work more 
closely with Beijing in putting pressure on Tokyo, but that 
closeness also bolstered the PRC’s role as an intermediary in 
inter-Korean affairs.40 
In an ironic way the rise of the PRC as an Asian power 
economically and militarily, that contributed to more tensions 
between China and Taiwan due to Taipei’s exploration of the 
Japan Times, February 10, 2004; Sebastian Moffett, “Japan’s Tough North Korea 
Stance Bears Fruit,’’ Wall Street Journal, May 24, 2004; Barbara Demick, “N. Korea 
Issues Threat To Japan,” Los Angeles Times, September 24, 2004; and unattributed, 
“Japan and North Korea; Insult and Injury,” Economist, December 18, 2004. 
37. For analysis of China’s disputes with Japan, see, unattributed, “China and Japan, 
So Hard To Be Friends,” Economisr, March 26, 2005; and Bennett Richardson, “No 
Apologies .4s Anti-Japan Riots Continue,” Christian Science Monitor, April 18, 2005. 
38. For coverage of those frictions, see, Robert Marquand, “Korea-Japan Dispute 
Strains Longstanding Alliances,” Christian Science Monitor, March 25, 2005; and 
unattributed, “South Korea and Japan, Rocky Relations.” Economist, March 26, 2005. 
39. Lee Joo-hee, “Intensifying China-Japan Row Takes Spotlight Off Korea,” Korea 
Herald, April 19, 2005. 
40. Sebastian Moffett, Gordon Fairclough, and Charles Hutzler, “Japan Takes Heat 
Amid Shift in Asia,” Wall Street Journal, April 7.2005; and Takeshi Kamiya, “ China, 
S. Korea: Japan Needs ‘Correct’ View of History,” Asahi Shimbun. May 10, 2005 at 
<www.asahi.com/english>. 
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possibility of pursuing national independen~e,~’ had an impact 
on South Korea’s relationships with Japan and the United States. 
This issue became more salient to South Korea’s position on 
overall U.S. policy toward Asia when Japan dropped its 
relatively ambiguous stance on whether it would help the United 
States defend Taiwan in the event of a PRC attack on Taiwan 
and in early 2005 overtly pledged to support the U.S. 
commitment to defend Taiwan.42 In part, Japan’s changer of 
course reflected Japanese concerns about the rise of Chinese 
power that it shared with the Bush administration., Against that 
background, coupled with China’s commitment to bolstering 
inter-Korean relations, South Korean leaders became concerned 
that the United States’ other Northeast Asian ally’s change of 
course regarding Taiwan would end up putting pressure on the 
ROK to do the same thing - compelling Seoul to have to take 
sides between the United States and China which it did not want 
Yet another China-related factor in the evolution of inter- 
Korean affairs is the way North Korea seems to have learned a 
to do.43 
41. For coverage of PRC-Taiwan frictions at the same time as U.S. concerns about 
North Korean brinkmanship were mounting, see, Lawrence E. Grinter, “Chinese 
Military Scenarios Against Taiwan; Premises, Options, Implications,” 
Counterproliferation Series 19 (December 2002), Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air 
University; Glenn Kessler, “U.S. Cautions Taiwan On Independence,” Washington 
Post, April 22, 2004; Michael Sheridan, “China Rattles Taiwan Sabre, ” London 
Sunduy Times, August 15, 2004; Philip P. Pan, “Chinese Premier Pledges To Hold On 
To Taiwan,” Washingron Post, March 6, 2005; and Philip P. Pan, “China Puts Threat 
To Taiwan Into Law,” Washington Post, March 14, 2005. 
42. Anthony Faiola, “Japan To Join U.S. Policy On Taiwan,” Washington Post ,  
February 18,2005. 
43. Unattributed, “China, Japan, and America; Keeping Their Balance,” Econonzist, 
February 26, 2005; and Robert Marquand, “As China Rises, U.S. Taps Japan as Key 
Asia Ally,” Christian Science Monitor, March 21, 2005. 
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perverse lesson from the United States’ earlier policy of 
strategic: ambiguity regarding support of Taiwan in its 
relationship with the PRC. Just as the United States tried to 
have its cake and eat it too in its relations with China and 
Taiwan via a simultaneous “one China” policy, its Taiwan 
Relations Act-based security commitment to Taiwan, and 
expectations that the United States’ two Northeast Asia allies 
(Japan and South Korea) will be supportive of U.S. 
commitments to Taiwan despite the lack of any formal 
commitment by either of them to do so until Japan’s policy shift 
noted above, North Korea seems to have learned from this 
model. Pyongyang uses a creative version of strategic ambiguity 
in its relations with both Seoul and Tokyo that takes advantage 
of the differences in South Korean and Japanese policies toward 
North Korea in a manner that enhances the DPRK’s form of 
diplomatic deterrence versus the United States because of the 
ways the United States tries to overcome these differences. 
This gap between the United States’ two allies underscores how 
the United States has become much closer to its Japanese ally 
than to its South Korean ally in terms of each’s position toward 
North Korea and how that disparity makes China’s role 
increasingly important to the ROK.44 North Korea’s creation of 
this brand of strategy ambiguity is useful to Pyongyang’s 
brinkmanship bargaining position on the U.S .-DPRK nuclear 
front. 
North Korea’s escalating nuclear brinkmanship created an 
44. Those South Korean perceptions were reinforced in mid-May 2005 when a 
Japanese deputy foreign minister told ROK officials that Japan could share some 
intelligence about North Korea with Seoul because the U.S. government “does not 
trust South Korea as much as Japan.” Unattributed, “South Korea and Japan, America 
Loves One Of Them More,” Economist, June 1 1, 2005. 
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awkward dilemma for the Bush administration as it tried to deal 
with the DPRK in a creative manner. A truly rogue member of 
the so-called “axis of evil” was reacting as though the trilateral 
axis was actually genuine, despite American recognition that it 
was a loose metaphor lacking any Middle East-Northeast Asian 
connections, thereby causing Washington to contemplate multi- 
front warfare - a war on terrorism, a war in Lraq, and a war in 
Korea. The United States has been scrambling to defuse the 
latter prospect. One of the means Washington used was to try 
to draw China into multilateral six-party diplomacy focused on 
North Korea that opened the door to the developments just 
described. In short, the United States was trying to make use 
of overlapping US.-PRC national interests to use China as 
means to achieve goals the United States desired. This U.S. 
effort raises interesting possibilities for China. 
While it is possible that the PRC will cooperate on U.S. terms, 
this seems unlikely. China has no incentive to be seen as doing 
the United States’ bidding regarding North Korea - conveying 
an image of being an instrument of U S .  policy. Being 
deferential to U.S. hegemony is not at all consistent with 
I3eijing’s world view. Moreover, the rise of China as a global 
economic power and its commitment to modernizing and 
expanding its armed forces which has attracted so much 
attention regionally and globally has caused concern in U.S. 
leadership circles. In early June 2005, at a major security 
conference in Singapore, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald 
Kumsfeld sharply criticized the PRC’s arms build up as 
unnecessary and a threat to Asian stability.45 Equally important, 
45. Thom Shanker, “Rumsfeld Issues A Sharp Rebuke To China On Arms,” New York 
? ? m a ,  June 4, 2005; and Mark Mazzetti, “Chinese Arms Threaten Asia, Rumsfeld 
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the vantage point reflected in China’s world view is identical to 
Pyongyang’s perception of the United States and increasingly is 
a factor in South Korean thinking - as demonstrated in the 
demeanor of the ROK’s president, Roh Moo-hyun. During 
Roh’s presidential campaign he pointedly refused to “kowtow” 
to U.S. leadership. 46 That refusal was significant in its 
substance as well as the Chinese expression he used to signal 
what Korea would not do. Early in his administration Roh 
resisted U.S. hard line “tailored containment’’ of North Korea,47 
leading some to fear a budding rift in the US.-ROK alliance. 
Although such a rift has been regularly disavowed by Seoul and 
Washington, there have been growing indications that South 
Korea’s policies toward North Korea, China, and the United 
States’ role in the region differ significantly from U.S. policies. 
Some of the roots of these differences stem from the Bush 
administration’s attitudes toward Roh Moo-hyun’s candidacy 
and victory48 and other roots stem from deviating perspectives 
in the post-9/11 strategic e n ~ i r o n m e n t . ~ ~  
In that context President Roh has been very forthright in 
articulating a more independent role for the ROK relative to its 
U.S. ally. Although South Korean officials -- led by President 
Says,” Los Angeles Times, June 4, 2005. 
46. Roh’s posture was assessed in Aidan Foster-Carter, “Spleen Versus Sense in 
Seoul,” Far Eastern Economic Review, December 19,2002. 
47. That approach was exposed in Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Readies Plan To Raise 
Pressure on North Korea,” New York Times, December 29, 2002. 
48. In addition to the prior citations on the election, see, Bruce Cumings’ description 
of a post-election ‘‘lecture’’ to Roh by an unnamed U.S. official who “hulked 
menacingly over the table, his face red and seemingly angered” about Roh’s position 
regarding North Korea. Bruce Cumings, “Rising Danger in Korea,” The Nation, 
March 24,2003. 
49. Norman Levin, Do The Ties Still Bind? The U.S.- ROK Security Relationship After 
911 1 (Santa Monica: RAND, 2004). 
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Roh - regularly emphasize the continued salience of the U.S.- 
ROK alliance, 50 his policy positions often send dissenting 
signals linked to South Korean perceptions of how U.S. policy 
toward North Korea and China do not mesh well with South 
Korean perceptions of what should be done. Clear examples of 
this were evident in President Roh’s speeches at the ROK Air 
Force Academy on March 8, 2005 and the ROK Military 
Academy on March 22, 2005 in which he outlined South 
Korea’s aspirations to be a strategic balancer between the United 
States and China and between the United States and North 
Korea, and envisaged the ROK within ten years taking over war 
time control of ROK forces from the United States as the 
alliance currently specifies.51 Roh’s comments at the Air Force 
Academy were especially pointed. He said, “I clearly state that 
the U.S. Forces Korea should not be involved in disputes in 
Northeast Asia without our consent” and “Our people will not 
get entangled in regional disputes against our will in the 
future.”52 Although Roh’s call for a “balancer” function was 
controversial among his domestic conservative opponents and 
the Bush administration, two South Korean polls indicated about 
seventy percent support for the balancer notion.53 This policy 
50. For examples of President Roh’s public focus on the alliance, see, Shim Jae-yu, 
“Roh Emphasizes Alliance With U.S.,” Korea Times, February 26, 2005; and Shim 
Jae-yun, “S. Korea-US. Alliance Is Solid,” Korea Times, May 21,2005. 
51. For coverage of the speeches and reactions to them, see, Joo Sang-min, “Seoul 
Preparing For Wartime Troop Control,” Korea Herald, March 25, 2005; and Burt 
Herman, “S. Korea To Play Neutral Role in Asia,” Newsday, April 10, 2005 at 
<www.newsday.com>. 
52. Unattributed, “Roh Tells U S .  To Stay Out Of Regional Affairs,” (UPI), 
Washington Times, March 1 1, 2005. 
53. Lee Joo-hee, “Majority Of Public Backs Korea ‘Balancer’ Role,” Korea Herald, 
4pril 1 1,2005. 
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vision, when coupled with some South Korean resistance to U.S. 
plans for militarily dealing with North Korea in the event of a 
crisis called greater attention to the emerging gap between the 
U.S.-ROK alliance partners. 54 When some South Korean 
conservative politicians criticized President Roh’ s vision, he 
retaliated by accusing them of being excessively “pro- 
American,” s thereby reinforcing the sense that there is a 
growing gap in the alliance. Although South Korean officials 
regularly denied that such a gap exists, the fact they worked 
assiduously to resolve issues that symbolize the “gap” suggests 
its reality. President Roh’s June 2005 summit with President 
Bush in Washington exemplifies that reality. Although the press 
coverage of the summit was p~si t ive,’~ there is ample reason to 
believe that the gap is real and will persist until one or the other 
shifts positions.57 
In the context of these strained U.S.-ROK ties China has a 
chance to take the lead on Korean issues. China can draw on its 
Confucian legacy that strongly influences both Koreas’ 
54. Jung Sung-ki, “Korea-U.S. Military Alliance Turns Sour,” Korea Times, April 12, 
2005; and Barbara Demick, “S. Korea Rejected U.S. Plan On North,” Los Angeles 
Times. April 16, 2005. 
55. Lee Joo-hee, “Opposition Lawmakers Prod Roh on ‘Pro-American’ Remarks.” 
Korea Herald, April 20, 2005. 
56. Gordon Fairclough, “South Korea, U.S. Seek To Mend Their Strained Ties,” Wall 
Street Journal, June 7 ,  2005; Howard LaFranchi, “Bush Meets Roh, Untying The 
Korean Knot,” Christian Science Monitor, June 9, 2005; David E. Sanger, “U.S. and 
Seoul Try To Ease Rift On Talks With The North,” New York Times, June 11, 2005; 
and Lee Joo-hee, “Roh, Bush Put New Pressure On N.K.,” Korea Herald, June 1 1 ,  
2005. 
57. For coverage of the ways the summit’s vague agreements amounted to ‘spin,‘ see, 
Paul Richter, “Bush, Roh Say They Share Goals,” Los Angeles Times, June 1 1, 2005; 
and Jung Sung-ki, “S. Korea, U.S. Differ on ‘Strategic Flexibility’,” Korea Times, 
June 15,2005. 
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perceptions of China. The PRC also shares a geopolitical bond 
with North Korea rooted in North Korean backing for the PRC’s 
creation and China’s intervention in the Korean War. Less 
known to most Americans, in recent years China has become 
South Korea’s primary economic partner and frequent 
diplomatic asset regarding the inter-Korean relationship. In short, 
the PRC is in an excellent position to be an intermediary - 
which is why Washington seeks to utilize China’s abilities to 
restrain North Korean recklessness, but does so in a manner that 
is not well received in Beijing. 
Unlike the United States, however, China is culturally more 
attuned to perceive the budding multifaceted crisis in Korea as 
an opportunity because of the way the Chinese written character 
for the word crisis (pronounced weijij, that also is used in the 
Korean language (where it is pronounced wigij, is comprised of 
the ideographs for danger and opportunity. Chinese and Koreans 
can relate to this nuanced concept in ways that escape the 
attention of most Americans. From a Chinese vantage point, the 
PRC can seize the moment and do what the United States is 
either unable or unwilling to do. 
For the short run, China could take the lead in persuading the 
North Koreans to comply with past UN sanctioned nuclear 
agreements in exchange for engagement incentives. As part of 
such a prospective deal, China’s growing economic clout in 
Asia can offer North Korea the economic means it requires to 
avoid collapse. South Korea is certain to join such a deal 
because it is central to Seoul’s engagement strategy. And Japan 
is very likely to cooperate to help avoid a disaster in North 
Korea. For the longer run, China also faces an opportunity to 
facilitate an arrangement where the two Koreas’ reconciliation 
and reunification will occur under Beijing’ s guidance and where 
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the Korean peninsula’s stability will be sanctioned by China. 
In short, China has a major opportunity to replace the United 
States’ central role in Korean affairs since the end of the Second 
World War on an incremental basis as part of the Korean peace 
process. This would restore a very traditional relationship. 
Since the United States will not respond to North Korean 
demands for a non-aggression pact that would preempt the Bush 
Doctrine’s preemption strategy, sees progressive economic 
engagement as appeasement, and is not truly supportive of either 
the Kim Dae-jung “sunshine policy” approach or the Roh Moo- 
hyun “policy of peace and prosperity” successor approach to the 
inter-Korean dialogue,5* China is well positioned on all these 
issues to take advantage of the situation. Beijing can take the 
lead via diplomatic preemption, carve out a dynamic nuclear 
role through the United Nations, undermine what PRC leaders 
describe as U.S. regional hegemonism, and become a catalyst 
for the creation of a stable unified Korean nation state - that 
would owe an enormous moral debt to China. 
Although Americans might well learn to regret not fulfilling 
that role were U.S. stature in Korea to be eclipsed by China, the 
United States should not stand in the way if China decides to 
exert such positive influence at the same time as the United 
States’ policy toward Korea leaves much to be desired. On the 
contrary, in those circumstances China should be encouraged by 
Americans to be innovative regarding Korea. Perhaps China can 
achieve what the United States either cannot or will not 
accomplish because of flawed policies or lack of resolve - much 
to the benefit of Korea and Asian regional stability. Since that 
58. Roh’s approach is described in detail in, The Policy of Peace and Prosperiy 
(Seoul: ROK Ministry of Unification, 2003). 
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stability is very important to U.S.-Asian relations, this criteria 
can be deemed essential. 
If events surrounding the Korean peninsula continue to evolve 
in this manner, the United States had better prepare itself to cope 
with the processes and the results. That challenge is exacerbated 
by the ways the ROK under President Roh Moo-hyun is 
reemphasizing the brand of independent foreign policy that he 
stressed in his election campaign and subsequent focus on South 
Korea playing a “balancer” role in the region. South Korean 
resistance to harder line U.S. approaches to North Korea is 
compounded by anxieties about Japanese acquiescence to that 
approach. The prospects for meaningful US.-ROK-Japan 
trilateral cooperation are not helped by South Korean 
perceptions of the greater utility of the PRC in the inter-Korean 
context versus the ambivalent roles of the United States and 
Japan in that context. 
The emphasis on South Korean “independence” and its 
“balancer” function is intensified by two factors. Most evident 
are the tensions stemming from progressive South Koreans’ 
perceptions of the way U.S. armed forces transformation plans 
will rearrange U.S. military deployments in Korea in a manner 
that will have a negative impact upon the existing level of inter- 
Korean strategic stability. These Koreans fear U.S. armed 
forces’ shifts could be part of a U.S. effort to set the stage for a 
preemptive attack on North Korea or some other move aimed at 
coercive regime change. These fears are behind public opinion 
polling that indicated more South Koreans think the United 
States poses a serious threat to ROK security than North Korea 
does by a 39% to 33% ratio.59 As negative as that is, polls 
~ 
59 Choe Song-won, “S. Koreans: U.S. Bigger Threat Than N. Korea,” Pacijic. Stars 
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indicate South Koreans think Japan is even more of a threat than 
either the United States or North Korea.60 These liberal South 
Koreans, who are President Roh’s core political constituency, 
also resent the level of pressures Washington put on Seoul to 
commit ROK forces in Iraq. These critics are ambiguous about 
the United States in terms of wanting to be seen as a reliable ally 
of the U.S. purposes in Iraq in order to assure that the United 
States will remain reliable in support of ROK purposes in the 
Korean peninsula, but not wanting to be seen as an abjectly 
obedient ally. This attitude is due to widespread Korean 
sensitivity to playing an excessively deferential follower’s role 
behind a strong-willed leader - thereby conforming to a sadaejui 
(flunkeyism) paradigm. Both of these factors reinforce rising 
Korean nationalism and desires for greater South Korean 
independence from U.S. international guidance. 
Arguably the best way for the United States to become more 
effective in coping with the prospect that responding to North 
Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship could yield this China-focused 
outcome about which many American analysts would have 
reservations, complicated by a South Korean “balancer” role 
about which such analysts would be equally skeptical, is to pay 
far more attention than it presently does to South Korean 
innovative ideas about how to handle North Korea. A solid 
example of such South Korean innovation was the ROK’s 
successful negotiations that produced a North-South meeting in 
Pyongyang on the fifth anniversary of Kim Dae-jung’s summit 
meeting with Kim Jong-il. The anniversary meeting between 
and Stripes, January 16, 2004. 
60. Ilnattnbuted, “South Korea and Japan, America Loves One Of Them More,” 
Economist, June 1 1,2005. 
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Kim Jong-il and ROK Unification Minister Chung Dong-young, 
held amidst the ongoing U.S.-DPRK tensions over the nuclear 
issue, reinforces President Roh Moo-hyun’s overall approach.“ 
There are many research centers in South Korea that focus on 
such aspects of crisis management and confidence building 
measures versus North Korea, and China’s role as a potential 
intermediary. The ideas spawned in these South Korean centers 
could be more thoroughly integrated within U.S. policy if 
Americans paid more attention to them in a systematic 
institutionalized fashion. One bureaucratic option to accomplish 
that level of policy coordination would be to create some kind of 
joint U.S.-ROK non-governmental research institute tasked with 
enhancing our shared appreciation for the nuances in peacefully 
dealing with North Korea and for coping with the results of 
either success or failure. The more the United States does to 
cooperate with our South Korean counterparts on such an 
agenda, the more likely it will lead to success - not failure. 
Clearly this would be a better way to cope with North Korean 
brinkmanship, deal with China’s growing influence, come to 
terms with Korean nationalism, and avoid the risks of 
accidentally falling over the brink into a nuclear catastrophe. 
As useful as that kind of institution could be, for it to prove to 
be viable in helping the United States and North Korea avoid 
going over that brink it is necessary for U.S. officials working 
on the North Korean nuclear issue and the American public’s 
views of what their government is doing on their behalf to 
become more familiar with the realities embodied by the DPRK 
and its policies. To put it mildly, despite decades of U.S.-DPRK 
61. Joo Sang-min, “Unification Minister Meets Kim Jong-il,” Korea Herald. June 18, 
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adversarial relations, the United States’ knowledge base 
regarding North Korea leaves much to be desired. Very few 
Americans have been to North Korea. The United States’ cadre 
of North Korean expertise is not as substantial as it could be. 
This is not meant to criticize those American specialists in 
Korean affairs who do focus on North Korea because they do 
their best. The point here is that their “best” would become far 
better than it is today if the U.S. government would change its 
policies so that bilateral and multilateral contacts of U.S. and 
DPRK experts in each other’s affairs could be expanded and 
intensified. This could be done by creating U.S. government- 
backed financial and institutional support for such regular 
contacts. reducing the restrictions on North Korean access to the 
United States in ways that would encourage reciprocal opening 
of North Korea to Americans, and positioning the U.S. 
government to make the best of such improved mutual US.-  
DPRK contacts. 
Although the immediate objective of such U.S. government 
policy shifts would legitimately be to create an improved 
environrnent for gathering accurate information about North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons and other threatening capabilities and 
to enable North Korea to fully understand the positive aspects of 
the United States’ goals of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula, 
such shifts also would have broader ramifications. The better 
informed U.S. experts on Korean affairs are about the realities 
of North Korea across the board, the more they will be able to 
provide accurate and valuable analyses to U.S. policy makers 
who draw on their analytical advice. This level of improved 
information and assessments would greatly enhance the 
prospects for U.S. policy toward both Koreas - and eventually 
toward a unified Korea - on truly diverse political, economic, 
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cultural, and diplomatic issues. Implicit in this would be 
American recognition and acceptance of the importance for the 
IJnited States to work more closely than we now do with South 
Korean experts on North Korean affairs and on overall Korean 
issues so that the United States can benefit from such Korean 
insights. If the U.S. government were to become more open to 
such interaction with both Koreas’ experts on each other’s 
affairs and on each’s policies toward the United States on 
nuclear and other issues, Washington would create incentives 
for both Seoul and Pyongyang to work more closely with 
American counterparts. The net result for U.S. policy toward 
North Korea - nuclear and otherwise - would be greatly 
enhanced access to information about Korea and insights into 
what is most likely to be helpful for improving U.S. policy. 
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